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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
FRED VANDERVEUR, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his request for post-conviction 
relief. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether petitioner may make a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
proceeding in which no Constitutional right to counsel existed. No standard of review 
applies to this issue. 
2. (a) Whether the trial court correctly found that no conflict of interest existed 
between petitioner and his appellate counsel. 
(b) Whether the trial court correctly found that petitioner's appellate counsel was 
not ineffective in briefing the issues raised in petitioner's prior appeal. 
Case No. 990178-CA 
Priority No. 3 
For both of these claims, involving issues of both fact and law, the following 
standard of review applies: 
Our standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for 
post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. Though we review 
the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, we will disturb 
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, "'we survey 
the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and 
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the 
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'" 
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, attached as Addendum D 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 29, 1997, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief (R.24). The petition was dismissed as frivolous by the trial court on October 2, 
1997 (R.38). Petitioner appealed (R.42). The Utah Supreme Court summarily 
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the petition, remanding for further proceedings 
and directing the trial court to appoint new counsel for petitioner (R.62). On remand, 
the trial court dismissed all of petitioner's claims as procedurally barred except for his 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (R. 101). Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the remainder of the petition, and petitioner timely 
appealed (R.622). 
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After petitioner's opening brief had been filed, the case was remanded to the 
trial court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 22, 1999 (R.735). By Notice 
dated November 12, 1999, petitioner's counsel informed this Court that no amended 
brief would be filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 18, 1986, Petitioner was charged with two counts of aggravated 
kidnaping, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 
1986) (R.617).1 Each charge included a firearm enhancement pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1986). At his circuit court arraignment, petitioner pled guilty 
to one count of aggravated kidnaping with the use of a firearm, and the second count 
was dismissed (R.616). Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life, 
along with a consecutive term of five to ten years for the firearm enhancement (R.616). 
Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea. On June 30, 1994, more than eight 
years after being sentenced, petitioner filed a pre? se motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
1
 Most record citations in the Statement of Facts are to the State's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (attached as Addendum A). In 
making its findings of fact, the trial court explicitly adopted the facts as stated in this 
memorandum: "In addition to the specific findings made and entered by the Court, the 
Court will incorporate the factual basis and references to the transcript found in the 
State's Memoranda . . . . The State's Memoranda is incorporated by reference in its 
entirety." September 22, 1999 Ruling, Finding of Fact #7 (R.736) (attached as 
Addendum B). 
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(R.616). The trial court denied most of the motion summarily, but sought a written 
response from the State on the sole issue of whether the sentencing court imposed a 
different firearm enhancement penalty than was explained to petitioner when he entered 
his plea. On July 12, 1994, the trial court entered a supplemental ruling denying 
petitioner's motion as it related to the firearm enhancement (R.616). 
Appeal from denial of the motion to withdraw plea. Petitioner appealed the 
trial court's denial of his motion, and filed a request for appointment of counsel. The 
Utah Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of 
petitioner's entitlement to appointed counsel, and the trial court appointed Alan 
Williams to represent petitioner on appeal (R.615). 
On January 20, 1995, Mr. Williams filed petitioner's opening brief, arguing 
that the trial court failed to comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 
accepting petitioner's guilty plea (R.615). On June 5, 1995, petitioner filed zpro se 
motion for substitution of counsel, along with a supporting memorandum and affidavit. 
Petitioner also filed a pro se motion for leave to file an amended or supplemental brief. 
On June 21, 1995, the court of appeals denied petitioner's motion for supplemental 
briefing and remanded the matter to the trial court for disposition of petitioner's request 
for substitution of counsel (R.615). 
On August 31, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for substitution of 
counsel. Petitioner then filed a pro se "Motion for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
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Determination and to Withdrawal of Appeal Brier in the court of appeals. The court 
of appeals granted petitioner permission to file a/?ra se supplemental brief, and then 
denied as moot petitioner's motions regarding ineffective counsel and withdrawal of 
Mr. Williams' brief (R.614). 
The trial court reconsidered its ruling regarding new counsel, and on October 
13, 1995, directed the court administrator's office to select defense counsel from the 
Salt Lake Area. The court of appeals stayed petitioner's appeal pending the 
appointment of new counsel. On January 11, 1996, the trial court reinstated its August 
31, 1995 order denying petitioner's motion for substitution of counsel and rescinded its 
October 13, 1995 order appointing a lawyer from Salt Lake (R.614). 
On March 20, 1996, in response to petitioner's pro se motion for extension of 
time to file a supplemental brief, the court of appeals ordered that all future filings on 
petitioner's behalf must be submitted by his appointed counsel, Mr. Williams. On 
April 1, 1996, Mr. Williams filed a new appellate brief raising the following issues in 
addition to the Rule 11 issues raised in the prior brief: (1) the charging information did 
not adequately inform petitioner of the nature of the charges because it did not 
specifically identify the victims; (2) petitioner's ineffective trial counsel impaired 
petitioner's ability to comprehend the plea proceeding in that counsel failed to request 
discovery or a bill of particulars, failed to explain to petitioner the elements of the 
offenses and the nature of the firearm enhancement, and did not assist the court in 
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establishing a factual basis for the plea; and (3) trial counsel failed to appeal 
immediately after sentencing (R.613) (Addendum C). 
On October 3, 1996, the court of appeals issued a memorandum decision 
modifying petitioner's sentence and affirming the trial court's denial of petitioner's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R.612) (Addendum A). The court specifically 
addressed petitioner's claim that the trial court failed to inform him of the maximum 
additional sentence for the firearm enhancement, finding that the trial court incorrectly 
informed petitioner that the maximum sentence for the enhancement was one-to-five 
years. Accordingly, the court of appeals modified petitioner's sentence for the firearm 
enhancement to one-to-five years. Id. The court acknowledged that petitioner raised 
other arguments, but found them to be without merit and declined to address them 
individually. Id. atn. 1. 
The relationship between petitioner and appellate counsel. The trial court in 
this case found that no conflict existed between petitioner and his appellate counsel, 
Alan Williams (R.736). The only possible evidence that Mr. Williams had time 
pressures that might interfere with his ability to represent petitioner was his 
acknowledgment that the trip from his home in Vernal to the prison at Gunnison was 
"somewhat burdensome." The court found that this evidence insufficient to support a 
finding that a conflict of interest existed. Id. Further, the court found that Mr. 
Williams effectively communicated with petitioner and responded to petitioner's 
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requests in a manner fully consistent with the standards of practice for criminal 
appellate attorneys. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was 
properly denied by the trial court because petitioner did not have a constitutional right 
to counsel for purposes of appealing the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is filed after sentencing, the 
motion should be considered as a petition for post-conviction relief for purposes of 
determining whether a right to counsel exists, and there is no right to counsel for 
purposes of seeking post-conviction relief. Courts have consistently held that there is 
no constitutional right to counsel in seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing 
and when no evidentiary hearing is held. Since petitioner had no constitutional right to 
counsel in pursuing his motion to withdraw his plea, he cannot now make a claim that 
he was denied a constitutional right because his counsel was ineffective. 
Point II. Petitioner's claim that his counsel had a conflict of interest fails 
because it is unsupported by the record and contradicted by the trial court's findings of 
fact. Petitioner does not challenge the trial court's findings, which are supported by the 
testimony in the record. 
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Point III. Petitioner has failed to show that his appellate counsel performed 
inadequately. Appellate counsel argued the most significant issues on appeal, and 
obtained a reduction in petitioner's sentence. 
In addition, petitioner has failed to show that any of the issues he asserts were 
omitted by his counsel would have been successful. Petitioner has not shown that any 
alleged mistakes by his trial counsel occurred, or that these alleged errors affected his 
decision to plead guilty. Petitioner has not shown that there was a jurisdictional defect 
in the information. The record does not support petitioner's argument that the trial 
court failed to accurately describe the effect of the firearm enhancement at the plea 
hearing, or that there was no factual basis for his plea. 
There is likewise no record to support petitioner's assertion that his counsel 
violated the rules of professional conduct, which do not require that criminal appellate 
counsel raise every issue identified by the client. Petitioner has also failed to articulate 
any proper grounds for seeking a rehearing from the court of appeals, and therefore has 
failed to show that counsel was inadequate for failure to file a rehearing petition. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER HAD NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
FOR HIS APPEAL FROM THE COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA, AND 
THEREFORE HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM FOR 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal 
from his motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to an alleged conflict of interest and 
failure to properly brief issues on appeal. Brief of Appellant, p. 11. This claim fails 
because it is premised upon a false assumption: that he had a constitutional right to an 
attorney in appealing from the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Unless petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in appealing the court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, he cannot make a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Wainright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (in 
proceedings where no constitutional right to counsel exists, defendant had no claim 
denial of effective assistance of counsel); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 752 (1991) (deficient performance of counsel in post-conviction review case does 
not excuse procedural default of claims since no right to counsel exists). 
In fact, there is no constitutional right to counsel for purposes of a post-
sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea. There is a constitutional right to 
representation by an attorney in only limited circumstances, such as a criminal trial and 
9 
a first appeal. See Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 877 (Utah 1990) ("The constitutionally 
guaranteed right to counsel encompasses the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
both at trial and on the first direct appeal of right") {citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 
387 (1985)); See also Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah 1994) (no 
constitutional right to counsel for defendants seeking post-conviction relief); Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings 
dependent upon nature of issues raised). 
In contrast, courts have consistently held that there is no constitutional right to 
counsel for purposes of filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea following sentencing 
and any initial appeal. For example, in Dankert v. Wharton, 733 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 
1984), after a defendant had been sentenced in state court, he sought appointment of 
counsel in order to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. When this request was 
denied, he filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court claiming that he had been 
denied the assistance of counsel in pursuing his motion. On appeal from the district 
court's denial of his petition, the court noted that "this court has long held that the state 
need not appoint counsel for indigent defendants in post-conviction and collateral 
proceedings." The court then considered the nature of a post-sentencing motion to 
withdraw a plea, and held that "[b]y analogy to the cases holding that there is no right 
to counsel in post-conviction and collateral proceedings, we hold that Dankert had no 
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absolute right to counsel at the post-conviction, discretionary plea withdrawal 
proceeding." Id. at 1538. 
Similarly, in State v. Watts, 565 N.E.2d 1282 (Ohio App. 1989), a defendant 
sought to withdraw his plea several years after his sentencing. His motion for 
appointment of counsel was denied, and the appellate court affirmed this denial. The 
court held that there is no right to counsel for purposes of a post-sentencing motion to 
withdraw a plea, which is analogous to collateral attack or discretionary appeal. Id. at 
1283. Accordingly, a long-delayed motion to withdraw a guilty plea such as the one 
filed by petitioner in this case, more than eight years after his sentencing, should 
considered a post-conviction proceeding for purposes of determining whether a right to 
counsel exists. 
Current Utah law governing motions to withdraw a plea strongly supports the 
Dankert court's equating of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea and a post-
conviction petition for purposes of determining the existence of a right to counsel. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999) provides that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
must be made within 30 days.2 Under this current rule, petitioner could only have 
2
 Since petitioner's guilty plea was entered three years prior to the enactment of 
§ 77-13-6 in 1989, defendant was not informed of the thirty day time limit. Failure to 
inform a defendant of the time limit may constitute grounds for extending the time limit 
to file a motion to withdraw, and the trial court's ability to entertain petitioner's motion 
was never challenged. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 582 
(Utah App. 1992). 
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challenged his plea and conviction by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, providing for post-conviction motions for which no right to counsel 
exists. See Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Utah 1996) ("'neither the Due 
Process Clause nor the equal protection guarantee of meaningful access requires a state 
to provide counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief/") {quoting 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah 1994). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) 
(providing that a motion to withdraw a plea may only be made prior to sentencing; after 
that, a defendant must file a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Since 
petitioner could not have even filed his motion under current law, and would not have 
been entitled to appointment of counsel in filing a post-conviction proceeding raising 
the same issues, it cannot be said that his right to file this motion is so fundamental that 
appointment of counsel is constitutionally required. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551, 555-57 (1987) ("States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief, 
and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does 
not require that the State supply a lawyer as weir). 
Although some courts have found that there is a right to counsel for purposes of 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such rulings have been expressly limited to those 
cases in which an evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of the motion, and the 
motion is filed prior to sentencing or prior to the time for filing a notice of appeal from 
the original conviction, such that the issues raised by the motion would be addressed in 
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that first appeal. State v. Harell, 911 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Wash. App. 1996) (right to 
counsel was triggered by trial court's unchallenged decision to hold a hearing on 
motion to withdraw plea); Padgett v. State, 743 So.2d 70, 73 (Fla. App. 1999) (right to 
counsel exists for motion to withdraw plea filed prior to time for appeal because, under 
state law, the plea withdrawal issues would be addressed during the direct appeal); 
Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (defendant has a right to 
counsel at a hearing on his motion to withdraw a plea filed between sentencing and 
appeal: "if an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel 
at sentencing and in the first appeal as a matter of right, that defendant would be 
entitled to the assistance of counsel in the interim period, absent a waiver.") (quoting 
King v. State, 613 So.2d 888, 891 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). 
Accordingly, since petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel for purposes 
of filing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or his appeal from the trial court's 
denial of his motion, he has no grounds for asserting that his appellate counsel's 
allegedly defective performance deprived him of any constitutional right. Wainwright 
v. Torna, 455 U.S. at 587-88. The trial court's dismissal of this case should be 
affirmed on this basis alone.3 
3
 Although this argument was not asserted in the court below, the trial court's 
dismissal of the petition may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record. See 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1996). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT NO CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST EXISTED BETWEEN PETITIONER AND HIS 
COUNSEL, AND PETITIONER DOES NOT CHALLENGE THIS 
FINDING OF FACT 
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had a constitutional right to representation of 
counsel on appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, he would have 
had the right to representation by conflict-free counsel. State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382 
(Utah 1999). Defendant claims that his appellate attorney, Alan Williams, had a 
conflict of interest which deprived him of his right to counsel. Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 12-19. In order to show this right was violated, petitioner "must establish both that 
[Williams] had an actual conflict of interest, and that the conflict adversely affected 
[Williams'] performance. To establish an actual conflict of interest, [petitioner] must 
show that [Williams] had to make choices that would advance his own interests to the 
detriment of [petitioner's]." Id. at 387 (citing State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 
1997)). 
Petitioner claims that his attorney had a conflict of interest based upon State v. 
Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687. In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered a defendant's claim 
that a conflict of interest existed because his attorney's financial interests conflicted 
with the attorney's ability to represent him. Id. Denying the claim, the Court held that 
"Taylor did not introduce any evidence regarding other demands on [his attorney's] 
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time or point to inadequacies in the time spent on this case. Without this information, 
we must accept the lower court's assessment that [the attorney's] income and resources 
did not affect his strategy and efforts in this case." Id. 
In this case, the trial court denied petitioner's claim that Williams had a conflict 
of interest due to time or financial conflicts, finding that petitioner failed to meet his 
burden of showing the existence of a conflict. "The Court has not been able to deduce 
from the transcript or any testimony contained therein any apparent conflict of interest. 
The only suggestion that there was a conflict would be Mr. Williams' statement that the 
trip from Vernal to Gunnison was extremely long and somewhat burdensome." 
(R.736). 
Petitioner did not file a supplemental brief following entry of the trial court's 
findings, and therefore has not challenged this factual finding. Instead, petitioner relies 
upon a variety of factual assertions contained in his opening brief which have no 
citations to the record, and which are entirely speculative. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 
12-19. These factual assertions are generally to the effect that Williams was unwilling 
to spend more than a small amount of time on petitioner's case because he was not 
adequately compensated for his work on the case, and made a much higher hourly rate 
for his work for other clients, causing him to neglect petitioner's appeal for monetary 
reasons. Petitioner asserts that Williams was forced to make a financial decision, 
15 
"advancing his own best interests" to the detriment of petitioner. Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 18-19. 
However, these factual assertions are not only made without any citations to the 
record, they are contradicted by the only testimony on the issue.4 During Mr. 
Williams' testimony, there was only one exchange regarding his compensation and the 
time he spent on petitioner's appeal: 
Q [by petitioner's counsel] 
And do you feel that your monetary compensation, contract 
with the county, and your time constraints in any way 
limited your representation of Mr. Tippett? 
A No. 
Transcript of Hearing, p. 91 (R.636).5 Petitioner has failed to present any evidence 
whatsoever that Williams' financial interests or time demands created a conflict of 
interest. There is no evidence in the record as to the amount Williams was paid for his 
4
 Petitioner testified to his belief that Mr. Williams had a conflict, but based this 
belief on the fact that Williams told him he was busy. Transcript of hearing, p.39 
(R.689). Petitioner did not offer any further evidence to support his conclusion that a 
conflict existed, and the trial court correctly relied upon the unrebutted testimony of 
Mr. Williams on this issue (R.636). See also Id., p. 54 (R.674) (petitioner testified 
that "it's hard to prove a conflict of interest because he knows what went on in his own 
mind. I would have a hard time proving it. I am more, arguing more that he was 
generally ineffective than anything.") 
5
 Petitioner's counsel went on to ask Williams whether he ever told petitioner 
that the long trip from his home in Vernal to the prison in Gunnison prevented him 
from spending adequate time on the case. Williams responded that he only told 
petitioner that the distance to the prison would prevent him from visiting petitioner 
"frequently or often." (R.636-37). 
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work on petitioner's case, what percentage of his income was generated by this case, 
how his compensation for petitioner's case compares to his compensation for other 
work, or the amount of time he spent on petitioner's case. 
Williams denied that his compensation had any effect on his representation, and 
the trial court's finding that there was no conflict of interest is fully supported by the 
record.6 
POINT III 
PETITIONER'S APPELLATE COUNSEL ADEQUATELY RAISED 
ALL APPROPRIATE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Again assuming arguendo that petitioner had a constitutional right to 
representation of counsel on appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, 
he would have had the right to effective assistance of counsel as a matter of due 
process. Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). "The standard for 
judging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as the standard for 
judging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Under that standard, a defendant must 
show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
6
 Petitioner re-argues this same point at pp. 45-47 of his brief, asserting that the 
trial court erred in re-appointing Williams to represent him on appeal. "Mr. Tippett 
notified both the trial court and the Court of Appeals of the fact that Allan Williams 
was laboring under a conflict of interest due to the time constraints, inadequate 
compensation, and duty to other clients." Id. However, as discussed above, the court 
found that, in fact, no conflict existed. 
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conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant." Id. at 1153 
(citations omitted). 
The standard for determining whether appellate counsel has performed 
adequately was recently addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904 
(10th Cir. 1999): 
When appellate counsel is alleged to be ineffective, we review with great 
deference counsel's decision to omit an issue on appeal, and reverse only if 
counsel fails to argue a "dead-bang winner." The Sixth Amendment 
does not "require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal." 
Because the alleged deficiencies on appeal relate to trial counsel's conduct, 
we review the claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on their 
merits, along with the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Thus, 
counsel frequently will "winnow out" weaker claims in order to focus 
effectively on those more likely to prevail. 
Id, 179 F.3d at 914 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Cook, 
45 F.3d 388, 394 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth Circuit has defined the phrase 'dead bang 
winner9 as "an issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would 
have resulted in a reversal on appeal." Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 n. 13 (10th 
Cir. 1995). 
In this case, petitioner's attorney effectively argued that petitioner was not 
properly informed of his possible sentence at the plea hearing, and was successful in 
obtaining a reduction in petitioner's sentence. See Memorandum Decision (Addendum 
A). Petitioner asserts that counsel should have raised a number of other issues in the 
appeal, but part of appellate counsel's task is to choose from among possible issues so 
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as not to distract the court from the most compelling arguments. Butterfield v. Cook, 
817 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1991) (a<a brief that raises every colorable issue runs 
the risk of burying good arguments* . . . 'Experienced advocates since time beyond 
memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on 
appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible or at most on a few key issues.'") 
(quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 752 (1983) ("There can hardly be any 
question about the importance of having the appellate advocate examine the record with 
a view to selecting the most promising issues for review.")). See also Smith v. 
Murray, All U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986) (tactical decision of appellate counsel not to raise 
an issue, even one later shown to have been viable, did not constitute ineffective 
assistance). 
In any event, petitioner has not identified any viable appeal issue not raised by 
his prior appellate counsel, let alone a 'dead-bang winner/ Petitioner identifies the 
following as issues that should have been raised by his Mr. Williams in his appeal: 
A. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Although Mr. Williams' brief raised 
the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, petitioner now maintains that this issue was 
inadequately briefed. 
Specifically, petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams should have more clearly 
argued the following alleged errors by trial counsel: (1) counsel waived the formal 
reading of the information; (2) counsel did not object to the information for failure to 
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include victim names; (3) counsel did not assist the trial court in finding a factual basis 
for the plea; (4) counsel did not object to the inaccurate description of the sentence 
imposed for the firearm enhancement; and (5) counsel provided false information to 
petitioner regarding the possibility that petitioner would be sent back to South Carolina 
to serve his sentence. 
Petitioner acknowledges that Mr. Williams raised the issue of the effectiveness 
of his trial counsel in the brief, and asserts only that the discussion of these issues was 
insufficient. Brief of Appellant, p. 21. However, in its ruling, this Court did not state 
that it was refusing to consider any issue because of inadequate briefing; rather, the 
ruling states that the Court found the arguments to be without merit. Memorandum 
Decision, p.l n.l (Addendum A). 
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the court of appeals did not properly 
consider the issues because they were inadequately briefed, petitioner would not have 
been able to show (and has still not shown) any prejudice. 
First, petitioner has failed to show that the alleged omissions of his trial counsel 
constituted deficient performance. Petitioner does not cite to any law for the 
proposition that defense counsel's routine waiver of the reading of the information is 
improper, that defense counsel has a duty to require that victim's names are included in 
the information, or that defense counsel must ensure that the trial court finds a factual 
basis for the plea. There is also no evidence in the record regarding any advice given 
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by petitioner's trial counsel as to the likelihood that petitioner would be sent to South 
Carolina to serve his sentence, or the accuracy of any information given him on this 
issue. 
In addition, even if these alleged acts were found to have occurred and to be 
constitutionally deficient, petitioner has not asserted any prejudice resulting from them. 
"Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, he or she must show 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel1 s errors, he 
[or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) {quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
59 (1985)). 
Petitioner has not cited to any evidence to support the conclusion that these 
issues would have changed his decision to plead guilty. Petitioner asserts in his brief 
that his "main motivation" for entering a guilty plea was his belief that he would be 
returned to South Carolina to serve his sentence. Brief of Appellant, p. 29. However, 
this assertion is made without any citation to the record, and no such evidence was 
offered to the trial court at the evidentiary hearing. 
B. Jurisdictional defect in charging document. Petitioner argues that Mr. 
Williams failed to argue that the information was insufficient to provide jurisdiction. 
The adequacy of the information was briefed by Mr. Williams, and the argument was 
found to be without merit by the court. See April 1, 1996 Brief of Appellant, p.8 
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(Addendum C). Mr. Williams argued that the information was deficient for failure to 
identify any victim, and that petitioner therefore did not have adequate notice of the 
charges. Id. 
Petitioner claims that Mr. Williams changed the substance of the argument 
petitioner told him to assert, arguing that this issue should have been briefed as a lack 
of jurisdiction rather than as a lack of notice. However, as Mr. Williams testified, his 
characterization of the issue was a reasonable strategy decision. Mr. Williams felt that 
since petitioner had clearly been misinformed of the possible length of his sentence, the 
best argument on appeal was for withdrawal of the plea. Mr. Williams concluded that 
it would be best to present the issue of the adequacy of the information as part of his 
challenge to the plea, further strengthening that argument by asserting that petitioner's 
plea was involuntary because he was not fully informed of the nature of the charges in 
addition to the possible sentence. (R.658-59). 
In considering a claim that counsel was deficient, counsel is given wide latitude 
in making tactical decisions and a reviewing court should not question such decisions 
unless there is no reasonable basis for them. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 
1996) (citing Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)); State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) ("we must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions'") (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 
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688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). Accordingly, counsel's treatment of the adequacy of the 
information issue should be considered a reasonable tactical decision. 
In any event, the jurisdictional argument based upon alleged deficiencies in the 
information lacks merit. Petitioner asserts that Utah law requires that an information 
identify victims by name in order to invoke the court's jurisdiction, citing State v. 
Topham, 123 P.2d 388 (Utah 1912) and State v. Wilson, 143 P.2d 907 (Utah 1943). 
To the extent that these cases support petitioner's jurisdictional argument, they are no 
longer valid law. Wilson held that failure to state the name of a victim (if known) is a 
fatal defect to a charging document, but this ruling was based upon a statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 105-11-1 (1943), which required that a victim be named. However, this 
statute had been repealed at the time of petitioner's charge. Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-1 
(1953), repealed by 1980 Utah Laws ch. 15, § 1; compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4 
(1982), enacted by 1980 Utah Laws ch.14, § 1 (current code of criminal procedure). 
See also Briggs v. Wilcox, 404 P.2d 752, 755 (Wyo. 1965) (noting that Wilson is based 
entirely upon Utah's statutory requirement that a victim be identified). At the time of 
petitioner's guilty plea, and currently, Utah law does not require that an information 
contain a victim's name in order to state an offense. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, states the requirements for an information, and provides that: 
An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by 
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common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b). There is thus no jurisdictional requirement that the information 
state the name of the victim. See State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 104-05 (Utah 1988) 
(indictment sufficient even though it merely repeated verbatim the broad, vague 
language of the statute: "an information or indictment is legally sufficient even if it 
consists of nothing more than an extremely summary statement of the charge that would 
not provide the accused with sufficient particulars to prepare an adequate defense"); 
State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1998) ("'What the defendant is entitled to is 
an information which sufficiently informs him to enable him to understand the charge 
against him and to prepare a defense. If it fulfills that requirement, it is sufficient. It 
need not serve the purpose of discovery . . . ."') (quoting State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 
120, 127 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). Accordingly, the information was sufficient to state 
an offense, and petitioner's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge 
the information on a jurisdictional basis. 
C. Failure to advise of consecutive nature of firearm enhancement. 
Petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams failed to raise the issue of whether the trial court 
adequately informed him at the time of his guilty plea that the firearm enhancement 
would be imposed consecutively to his sentence for aggravated kidnaping. Brief of 
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Appellant, p. 34. There is no record support for this argument, and Mr. Williams was 
not ineffective in not arguing it on appeal. 
At the change of plea hearing, the trial court properly informed petitioner of his 
possible sentence, including the nature of the firearm enhancement: 
THE COURT: You understand that being a first degree felony carries with 
it a sentence of five years to life in the Utah State Prison? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: It also carries with it a firearm enhancement penalty of not 
less than one or up to five years on top of that. Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Transcript of plea hearing, p. 7 (R.341) (emphasis added). Petitioner asserts that the 
phrase "on top of" is somehow ambiguous, but does not explain how a firearm 
"enhancement" imposed "on top o f his other sentence could be anything but 
consecutive. As the Court of Appeals noted, "[d]uring the taking of the plea, the trial 
court informed defendant that a one to five year firearm enhancement was possible in 
addition to the sentence for the underlying aggravated kidnaping charge." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 2. (Addendum A) 
Petitioner also claims that the trial court did not adequately explain the 
indeterminate nature of the sentence. Brief of Appellant, p. 33. However, in accepting 
a guilty plea, the trial court is only required to inform a defendant of the maximum 
sentence possible and the effect of any minimum mandatory sentences applicable. 
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There is no requirement that the trial court explain the nature and practical effect of an 
indeterminate sentence under Utah law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). In addition, 
petitioner does not cite to the record in support of his assertion that he did not, in fact, 
understand Utah's indeterminate sentencing, and no evidence was offered on this point. 
D. Failure to establish a factual basis for plea. Petitioner asserts that Mr. 
Williams was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in accepting his 
guilty plea without making an explicit finding of a factual basis for the plea. Brief of 
Appellant, p. 35. However, petitioner did not make this argument in his motion to 
withdraw his plea, and Mr. Williams was therefore not ineffective for failing to raise it 
on appeal from the denial of that motion. See State v. Amoroso, 975 P.2d 505, 507 
(Utah App. 1999) ("As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue raised 
for the first time on appeal."). Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was not 
made part of the record in this case. It is attached as Addendum F to the state's brief in 
petitioner's prior appeal, Case No. 950280-CA. In a footnote in petitioner's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner alludes to the issue of whether there was 
"insufficient evidence to support the guilty plea," but explicitly states that he is not 
raising this claim in support of the motion, subject to a possible amendment which was 
never sought. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p. 4, n. 5. 
Further, petitioner's argument is based upon an unsupported, unargued 
assumption regarding the record in the underlying criminal case. Petitioner asserts that 
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no factual basis for the plea exists, without any citation to the record, based solely on 
the transcript of the change of plea hearing. Brief of Appellant, p. 35. However, 
when determining whether there is a factual basis for a plea, the court must review the 
entire record of the case to determine if a factual basis can be found, regardless of 
whether that evidence was examined by the trial court during the plea hearing. In State 
v. Stilling, 856 P2d 666, 674 (Utah App. 1993), the court held that although a factual 
basis for the plea must be found in the record, that record includes the entire record 
before the court. 
The record we examine to determine the presence of a factual basis for 
Stilling's plea consists of the entire record before us on appeal, which 
includes all portions of the trial court record certified on appeal. 
Although Stilling has argued that the record as a whole should be limited 
to the plea hearing proceedings, we include in our review other portions 
of the trial court record and the affidavit of Stilling's trial counsel. 
Id. at 674.7 Likewise, in State v. Willett, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992), the trial court 
failed to address the existence of a factual basis at the plea hearing, and the supreme 
court found nothing in the record of the plea hearing to support a finding that a factual 
basis existed for the plea. Id. at 861. However, in order to consider whether a factual 
basis did, in fact, exist, the court took judicial notice of a partial preliminary hearing 
transcript. Although the court found that the partial transcript available to it did not 
7
 As was the case in Stilling, at the time of petitioner's plea, Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, did not require that the trial court find a factual basis for the 
plea at the plea hearing itself. See Id., 856 P.2d at 673 n. 6. 
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provide sufficient evidence of an adequate factual basis, it remanded the case to the trial 
court "to permit the State an opportunity to produce a proper transcript of the 
preliminary hearing or to otherwise prove what occurred there." Willett, 842 P.2d at 
863. 
Petitioner asserts on appeal, without reference to the record, that there is no 
factual basis in that record, but failed to offer any proof of this assertion to the trial 
court in this case. The entire underlying criminal trial record must be reviewed to 
determine the existence of a factual basis, and that record was never submitted to the 
trial court in this case. Thus, although petitioner's brief alleges that the criminal trial 
record does not contain a factual basis, only a portion of that record- the change of plea 
hearing-was admitted below or included in the record on appeal. See State v. Penman, 
964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) ("'When a defendant predicates error to [an 
appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an 
adequate record/") (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982)) 
Accordingly, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that Mr. Williams was 
ineffective in failing to argue this issue in the original appeal: petitioner did not himself 
raise it in his motion, the denial of which was the subject of the appeal, and the record 
in this case does not support petitioner's claim that a factual basis did not exist 
anywhere in the criminal trial record. 
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E. Failure to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Petitioner 
argues that Mr. Williams was ineffective because he violated Rules 1.2 and 1.4, Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Brief of Appellant, pp. 36-41. 
With regard to Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, petitioner asserts that Mr. 
Williams omitted or changed the nature of several arguments without petitioner's 
permission. Brief of Appellant, p.37. However, petitioner's quotation of the rule in 
his brief omits with ellipses the operative language for representation of a criminal 
defendant: 
Rule 1.2. Scope of representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives 
of representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and shall consult 
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement 
of a matter. In a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2 (emphasis added). Thus, in a criminal case, 
counsel is only obligated to abide by his client's decisions on specified matters, which 
do not include the choice of issues to present on appeal. It is well established that an 
attorney in a criminal case retains the ability to choose which arguments to pursue on 
appeal, even over the objections of his client. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983) (defendant does not have the right to compel appointed counsel to make even 
non-frivolous arguments "if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not 
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to present those points"). Accordingly, the issue is not whether Mr. Williams made or 
did not make arguments contrary to petitioner's wishes; rather, the court must 
determine whether Williams' performance was adequate under constitutional standards. 
Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 337. 
Petitioner also cites to Rule 1.4, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
requires that a lawyer keep his client informed about the status of the case and allow the 
client to make reasonably informed decisions. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams 
violated this rule, but does not cite to the record for any facts to support this argument. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 39. In addition, the trial court explicitly rejected this allegation, 
finding that "Mr. Williams effectively communicated and in fact adequately complied 
with Tippett's request for communication to the extent that would be required of 
Counsel generally practicing in the area of Criminal Appeals and within the standard of 
practice recognized as effective." (R.736). This finding of fact is not challenged on 
appeal. 
F. Failure to petition for rehearing. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams was 
ineffective in failing to seek a rehearing following the court of appeal's decision. 
Petitioner argues that rehearing was appropriate because in finding that the trial court 
failed to accurately describe the possible length of the sentencing enhancement, the 
court of appeals erred in failing to also find that petitioner was not informed of the fact 
that the enhancement would be consecutive to his kidnaping sentence. Brief of 
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Appellant, p.42. However, as petitioner has pointed out, Mr. Williams did not make 
this argument to the court of appeals in the first place, so there would not have been 
any basis for a rehearing request. See Utah R. App. P. 35 ("The petition shall state 
with particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has 
overlooked or misapprehended . . . " ) . In any event, this argument is without merit. 
See supra, Point III.C.8 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the trial court's denial of this petition should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( 5 day of January, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KEITO WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
8
 Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing to enter findings of fact 
pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Brief of Appellant, pp. 11, 
47-48. However, this case was not remanded for a hearing under Rule 23B, which 
applies only to direct criminal appeals, and not to this civil post-conviction proceeding. 
Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) ("A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court 
to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the 
appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."). In any 
event, after petitioner's brief was filed, this matter was remanded to the trial court for 
entry of findings. See September 14, 1999 Order Granting Motion to Remand and to 
Stay Briefing; Ruling (R.735). 
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Addendum A 
FILED 
liA^t feAfi^ OCT 0 3 1996 
r * ;* --* ,K £*&« * * J» THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wayne S. Tippett, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950280-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 3, 1996) 
Eighth District, Vernal Department 
The Honorable John R. Andersen 
Attorneys: Alan M. Williams, Vernal, for Appellant 
Kris Leonard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Greenwood. 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant's main contention on appeal is that the trial 
court violated Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) by failing to inform him, 
before he entered his guilty plea, of the maximum additional 
sentence that could be imposed upon him by reason of the firearm 
enhancement.l 
In State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987), our 
Supreme Court held that strict compliance with the constitutional 
and procedural requirements for the taking of a guilty plea was 
required before such a plea could be taken. However, pleas taken 
before Gibbons2 are upheld so long as the record as a whole 
demonstrates "substantial compliance" with Rule 11 of the Utah 
1. Although defendant raises additional arguments, they are 
without merit and we decline to address them further. See, e.g.. 
state v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (w[T]his Court 
need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, 
issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal."). 
2. Gibbons was a clear break with the Supreme Court's rulings in 
previous cases dealing with the validity of guilty pleas and, 
therefore, is not applied retroactively. State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 
1119, 1123 (Utah 1991). 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. Willett v. 
Bames, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 
1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991). In this case, defendant's plea was 
taken prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gibbons and, 
therefore, must be evaluated under the substantial compliance 
test. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences . . . • 
During the taking of the plea, the trial court informed defendant 
that a one to five year firearm enhancement was possible in 
addition to the sentence for the underlying aggravated kidnaping 
charge. Defendant then entered his plea of guilty. However, at 
defendant's sentencing, following the receipt of a presentence 
report indicating five prior convictions for armed robbery, the 
court enhanced defendant's minimum mandatory term of fifteen 
years to life with a consecutive term of five to ten years for 
his use of a firearm.3 Because the trial court failed to inform 
defendant of the maximum sentence that could have been imposed 
upon him by reason of the firearm enhancement, the trial court 
was not in substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 on 
this point. 
Nonetheless, it is not necessary that defendant be allowed 
to withdraw his guilty plea since the problem is limited to the 
3. Of course, at the time the plea was taken, the trial court 
did not know of the additional convictions. Nonetheless, the 
point could have been adequately covered by explaining the 
enhancement scheme to defendant and emphasizing that the 
enhancement to be ultimately imposed would depend on the number 
and nature of his prior convictions, but could be as much as ten 
years. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1996). 
9S0280-CA 2 
firearm enhancement. At the invitation of the State, we modify 
defendant's sentence by reducing the firearm enhancement to that 
which had been explained to him, namely, not less than one year 
nor more than five years. J£SL£ State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1211 
(Utah 1993)(holding that appellate courts have the authority to 
modify criminal judgments on appeal). The order appealed from is 
otherwise affirmed. 
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Addendum B 
EP\ V: ?cco 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRED VANDERVEUR, 
Respondent, 
SEP 2 * «99 
COURT OF APPEALS 
-qWJtcfl 
R U L I N G 
Case No: 970800314 
This matter is again before the Court on Remand for the entry on Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of the Court's February 8,1999 denial 
of Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the transcript of the proceedings and will 
note that at the conclusion of the hearing on September 23rd, 1998 the Court 
requested Counsel to file Summary Memoranda giving their respective versions 
of what the evidence showed and the appropriate law. The Court has carefully 
reviewed the respective Memoranda and at the time of it's prior ruling simply 
intended to incorporate by reference the view of the record and the facts as set 
forth in the Respondent's Memorandum. 
The Court upon remand will now enter it's own Findings of Fact: 
1. It would appear from the record that Counsel Williams visited with the 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Mr. Tippett at the Gunnison Prison on two 
occasions. 
2. That although relations became somewhat strained they were later 
ironed out by the testimony in the record. 
3. That Attorney Williams and Defendant Tippett corresponded regularly 
and Williams included salient points in the brief before the Court 
pursuant to his own determination of what would be effective and also 
in a second brief the sub-issues requested by Mr. Tippett. 
4. The Court has not been able to deduce from the transcript or any 
testimony contained therein any apparent conflict of interest. The only 
suggestion that there was a conflict would be Mr. Williams statement 
that the trip from Vernal to Gunnison was extremely long and somewhat 
burdensome. 
5. The Court has no additional evidence in the record to determine an 
actual conflict or that the conflict existed and the burden would be on 
Tippett to demonstrate a conflict. 
6. The Court finds by preponderance of the evidence in the record that Mr. 
Williams effectively communicated and in fact adequately complied with 
Tippett's request for communication to the extent that would be 
required of Counsel generally practicing in the area of Criminal Appeals 
and within the standard of practice recognized as effective. 
7. After reviewing the trial record Attorney Williams briefed every issue he 
determined viable. In addition to the specific findings made and entered 
by the Court, the Court will incorporate the factual basis and references 
to the transcript found in the State's Memoranda and support the 
argument that Tippetts was given and Williams offered effective 
assistance. The State's Memoranda is incorporated by reference in it's 
entirety. 
From the forgoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the 
following Conclusions of Law. 
1. From the facts adduced in the record the Petitioner has failed to carry 
the burden by preponderance of the evidence that Williams acts or 
omissions fell outside the range of professionally competent assistance 
and that William's deficient performance, if any, prejudiced the outcome of 
the proceeding. The Trial Court will exercise it's sound discretion in 
leaving the lawyer on board even where the defendant voices some 
dissatisfaction with Court appointed Counsel where there are no facts in 
the record to establish that the animosity between Tippets and Williams 
resulted in such a deterioration of the attorney client relationship that the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel was imperiled or that there was 
a complete breakdown in communication. 
This Court will conclude that Petitioner's Request for Post-Conviction 
Relief will be denied and the Petition will be Dismissed with Prejudice. 
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Addendum C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Defendant/Appellant. , 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 95-0280 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2-3 (i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
The Court should review this case using an "abuse of 
discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall, 787 P. 2d 744, (Utah, 
1987) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as 
Title 77, Chapter 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of a 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea submitted by the defendant/ 
appellant on the 9th day of June, 1994. The motion was denied by 
two separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supplementary 
ruling dated July 12, 1994. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Eighth District 
Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February, 
1986 with two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of 
Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated. Each count also provided a 
Firearms Enhancement Provision pursuant to Section 76-3-203 Utah 
Code. On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty 
to Count One of the Information. Count Two of the information was 
dismissed. The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used 
to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/Appellant's Rule 
11(e) rights at the time of plea. After a colloquy with the 
Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea. 
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of 
March, 1986, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. The Defendant/ 
Appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence at the Utah 
State Prison of 15 years to life with a firearm enhancement 
requiring an additional 5 to 10 years to be served consecutively 
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with the 15 years to life sentence. On May 20, 1987 at the request 
of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court reviewed the 
Defendant/Appellant's sentence. The court, the Honorable Dennis 
Draney presiding, re-affirmed the sentence originally imposed. On 
June 9, 1994, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
before the Eighth District Court. The plea was defective in that 
the elements of the offense were not explained to Defendant/ 
Appellant. It was further defective in that the trial court did 
not give the Defendant/Appellant the proper maximum punishment, nor 
explain the nature of the Utah indeterminative sentencing. Counsel 
for the Defendant/Appellant's performance was inadequate in that 
he did not explain any of the required Pre-requisites to a valid 
plea. The information was defective in that it did not adequately 
identify any victim of the alleged crime. Counsel's performance 
was also deficient in that he also did pursue any information to 
cure the defective information. All the prior judges having 
retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case was re-assigned to 
the Honorable John R. Anderson. Judge Anderson issued a summary 
ruling to the motion to dismiss, the State having given no response 
to the motion. That ruling, dated June 29, 1994 denied all aspects 
of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea excepting for a 
response by the State the issue of an inadequate explanation of 
the firearms enhancement. After considering the State's response, 
on July 12, 1994 and giving the Defendant no opportunity to 
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consider the State's response, Judge Anderson issued a ruling 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in its 
entirety stating that the court had substantially complied with the 
requirements of Rule 11(e). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
is in error. The court made no findings that the appellant waived 
his right to self incrimination. The court made no findings that 
the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and 
that his plea admitted each and every element. The court 
incorrectly advised the defendant as to the maximum sentence which 
could be imposed. The information was deficient in that it did not 
advise the Defendant/Appellant of the identity of the victims. 
Defendant/Appellant was deprived of key elements of effective of 
counsel in that no discovery was requested, discussed with 
Defendant/Appellant, nor were there any attempts to explain the 
sentencing, or cure the defective information. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE IT FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e) OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect 
at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-35-
11(e) provided as follows: 
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty) until the 
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court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel 
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all 
of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited. From the 
record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the 
court can only determine the trial court's compliance with rule 
11(e) based on the oral representations made in open court. 
That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on 
several critical points included in the rule. There is no 
discussion whatsoever with the appellant concerning his right 
against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3) 
of the rule. There is no discussion of the nature and elements of 
the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement 
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule. There is no discussion 
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or record that the guilty plea was an admission to each of the 
elements of the alleged crime as required by subsection 4 (Record, 
pp 4-7). 
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative mis-
represented to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a 
result of the plea. Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding 
that the defendant understands both the minimum and maximum 
possible sentence. At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial 
judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement 
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally 
explained. No correction of that error was made. The appellant 
was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct 
contradiction to what had been explained. 
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an 
"abuse of discretionM by the court. The companion cases of Warner 
vs. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks vs. Morris, 709 
P. 2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial 
court accepts guilty pleas. The Supreme Court stated that a 
failure of to advise a defendant of his rights concerning self-
incrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea 
provided that the record as a whole showed that the rule 11 
requirements were substantially complied with. Subsequently the 
Supreme Court in State vs. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987) 
replaced the "substantial compliance" rule with a "strict 
compliance" standard. It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was 
not retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are 
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complete that here. Here as well, we have not only a failure to 
inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation 
by the court as to the maximum sentence. WHen coupled with the 
failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is 
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been 
substantially complied with. Finally, even though there was some 
discussion of some of the RUle 11 requirements at the time the plea 
was entered, no findings were made except that the plea was 
knowingly made. (Record p 8). 
POINT II 
THE PLEA WAS IMPROPERLY TAKEN BECAUSE THE INFORMATION 
DID NOT ADEQUATELY INFORM THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CHARGES. 
The information to which the Defendant/Appellant alleges as 
follows: 
Count : AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, in violation Section 
76-5-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, on or 
about February 17, 1986, in Uintah County, Utah, a First 
Degree Felony; 
The said defendant at the time and place aforesaid 
did intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim, by any means and in 
any manner, seized, confined, detained, or transported 
the victim with intent: 
a. To hold for ransom or reward, or as shield 
of hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
b. To facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of felony; or 
c. To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize 
the victim or another. . . . 
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and that the filing of a bill of particulars is normally one of the 
proper remedies to an inadequate information, that statement only 
illustrates another issue which will be addressed later in this 
matter, that is, the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The lack of identity of the victims illustrates again the 
inadequacy of the inquiry at the time of the taking of his plea. 
It has already been stated that the record is bereft of any 
discussion of the elements of the offense charged. Because no bill 
of particulars was filed, the Defendant/Appellant did not have a 
more specific information that the original one which was filed. 
There is no indication that any request for discovery was ever 
filed nor that any discovery was given to the defendant. All of 
these things which might have had some curative effect upon the 
lack of the notice in the information did not occur. The failure 
to explain the elements of the crime, and to get a factual basis 
for the plea become even worse. 
POINT 3 
THE INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL FURTHER IMPAIRED 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCEEDINGS 
WHEN THE GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN. 
The performance of defense counsel in adequately representing 
his client is always a difficult issue in that much of any 
representation is not on the record. The attorney client privilege 
makes it difficult for an attorney to respond to ineffective 
assistance accusations, nevertheless there is guidance on what 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In State v. 
Moritzsky, 771 P 2d. 689 (Utah App. 1989), Defense attorney Lance 
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favorable to defendant/appellant than his plea is difficult. It 
must be noted however that since the defendant/appellant received 
the maximum sentence allowed by law for one count of aggravated 
kidnapping, and the statutory preference was for concurrent 
sentences at the time, it is hard to say that no better result 
could have been obtained for the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case shows affirmative mistakes by the 
court and counsel in the taking of appellant's plea. It does not 
show strict compliance, substantial compliance, or anything 
approaching the required standard. The process was further 
complicated by defense counsel's ineffective performance in the 
process of the plea. Since the information was defective in notice 
to the defendant, the problem grew even worse. Appellant hereby 
prays that the court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this (r^ day of ApvT^ ( , 1996. 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addendum D 
UTAH RULES <H fRIMiN/'H llidni MHIKh 
RUJ osecution of public offenses, 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indict-
ment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense 
has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information, shall charge the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by 
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information 
may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out 
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things 
as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged 
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are generally known or by which they 
may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning 
such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presump-
tions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper lan i^m^ h i i i 
indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at 
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an 
indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such 
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the 
same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to 
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for 
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten 
days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as 
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall 
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name 
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, o 
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual 
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal 
meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather tit an the conjunctiv e shall not in * alidate the 
indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information 
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall 
not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on 
application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, 
except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he 
proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to 
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. 
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural 
person. 
